Preliminary remarks

The text below was written by an anonymous pilot of the 497.APIB. Unfortunately, we did not get other testimonials about the events described in that story. Memories dating back several decades do indeed deserve to be corroborated by several people before they can be considered authoritative. Although we believe that this story is not strictly accurate, we have chosen to publish it in its entirety because it gives a good idea about the nature of large-scale exercises that took place at that time.

Total mobilization!

In the summer of 1979, the 16th Air Army conducted a series of air exercises in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG), with units redeploying to unfamiliar GSVG airfields alongside combat operations at the group's training grounds. One day, the 497 APIB was alerted and tasked with a regimental sortie to strike targets at the Heidehof training ground and subsequently land at a dispersal airfield in the Hasleben area, 35 km from the West German border. The aircraft were then to be prepared with their maximum bomb load for a squadron-by-squadron strike at targets at the Wittstock training ground. It turned out that almost all units of the Air Army had been alerted at dawn that day, and combat and support aircraft had begun carrying out their assigned missions. Regiments from the northern corps landed at airfields in the southern corps, and vice versa. All of the force group's training grounds suitable for aviation operations were used.IBA units and attack helicopters carried out strikes on ground targets, while fighter jets practiced intercepting airborne targets and conducted ground operations.All of this took place against the backdrop of a complex operational environment, jamming, and typical European weather (haze and broken clouds). Trouble began with takeoff. In our regiment, the aircraft of one of the group's leaders caught fire during takeoff from a shelter. He quickly took a spare, and the regimental sortie was not aborted.

We proceeded normally during the first stage, although we sensed the full gravity of the situation: after all, there were several hundred combat aircraft and helicopters in the air at once. The control towers were nervous, the onboard radios often malfunctioned, and some intermittent chatter could be heard. The pilots' training and the leaders' resourcefulness helped. We landed at the dispersal airfield, where normally only the airfield crew was present. While we were preparing the aircraft and clarifying the mission, we learned that at Brand Airfield, during takeoff of a MiG-27 flight from Lärz, the wingman of the first pair had skidded off the runway, flipped over, and burned. The pilot managed to escape from the burning aircraft. The second regimental sortie took place in the middle of the day; maneuvers were in full swing, with the maximum number of crews in the air. We took off in pairs, assembled by squadron, and took separate routes to the Wittstock training ground. It was clear from the start that the "moment of truth" was approaching, and now it would be clear who was worth what. It was impossible to get confirmation from the command post that we were taking our flight level; the radio was completely jammed. While the leader unsuccessfully tried to contact the command post (including through the control tower), we (three flights, 12 aircraft) were still flying at an altitude of 300 meters. I was the wingman in the first pair.

Suddenly, I saw a large group of aircraft swarming to the right, slightly above us, on a crossing course, at a distance of 500-1000 meters. They saw us too and started turning away. At first, we thought it was a group of fighters trying to get into a fight, but then it turned out we'd just rendezvoused with our neighboring squadron.We let them go ahead and devised an improvised Cobra-style anti-missile maneuver to spread out our flight path and avoid interfering with each other on the range. Since there was still no contact on any channel, we flew under the clouds, low down, beneath the corridors from West Berlin to West Germany. We understood each other without words, closed ranks, tuned in, and trusted our commander and a lucky break. Along the way, we saw small and large groups of aircraft flashing above and to the side, but no one tried to attack us, and we were grateful for that. At the transition point to the range channel, everyone switched over and realized the worst was just beginning. There was a hubbub; it was impossible to understand anything. Since we arrived close to the estimated time and the targets had been predetermined, we circled the range, spread out, chose a window so that no one was ahead or above, and headed towards our targets.

At that time, several groups of aircraft were flying over the range; it was completely covered in smoke, and it was unclear who was where and what they were doing. We approached in flights in a shallow dive, unloaded, pulled out, and then dropped back to low altitude. While egressing the range, several aircraft passed us on intersecting courses; you had to keep your head turned. We retreated about 15 kilometers and then began climbing to the assigned flight level. As we approached the airfield, the radio traffic calmed down; we more or less sorted things out, and we approached for the landing pattern. We prepared the aircraft again, and made another run to Heidehof, landing in Grossenhain close to dusk. Then we began counting our wounds and our comrades. During that long and difficult day, aside from the breakdown and accident mentioned above, the Air Army experienced only three flight incidents (I remember a bird strike on a MiG-21bis and the pilot's ejection, something happening at the range, and an engine stalling on one aircraft). Naturally, we were hit with shrapnel from various types of aircraft to our hearts' content. But given the chaos with controls and communications, it's surprising we got off so easily. I still can't figure out whether the jamming was ours to test the real proficiency of the flight crews, or the enemy's to disrupt the training exercises, or whether it was caused by the simultaneous operation of so many radios...

What to think?

With the main firing ranges active at the same time - Wittstock and Heidehof are mentioned and it seems reasonable to think that at least Retzow and Belgern were also involved - and also most of the airfields active, it is hard to believe that such an exercise went unnoticed by the Allied military liaison missions. The USMLM unit history for 1979 mentioned a tri-service (British, French and US missions) coverage of the Wittstock firing range between the 10th and the 27th July during the conduct of an "air power demonstration." While unidentified - at the time - stores and pods were seen, there was no remark about the level of activity. During the same period, the first Su-24 deployed outside the USSR were photographed at Gross Dölln on 19th July. These aircraft of the 455.IIAP from Voronezh took part in the exercise "Udar-79." We ignore however if the latter was the global exercise mentioned above. The participation of the Su-24 in the "air power demonstration" is probable, but was not highlighted in 1979 the USMLM Unit History.

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