Une cible M-6 accrochée sous le ventre d'un MiG-23UB tchécoslovaque paré pour une mission au-dessus de la Baltique. D'un diamètre de 28 cm, elle mesurait un peu plus d'un mètre de long et pesait 98 kg. © S.Rogl.

An M-6 target under the belly of a Czechoslovak AF MiG-23UB ready for a new mission over the Baltic Sea. It was a little bit more than one meter long with a diameter of 28 cm. The weight was 98 kg. © S.Rogl. However, the Il-28s were not necessarily required for air-to-air gunnery. The dedicated targets could be carried indeed by the fighters themselves as well. Two types of targets could be used, both externally looking like weapons! They could be M6 chute-retarded targets, which had the appearance of a 100-kg bomb with very small fins. An Il-28 without winch could carry up to ten targets inside its bomb bay and two underwing as well. Once released, they descended slowly - 5 to 8 meters per second - hanging under a 9 meters rope below a 36 m² parachute. The body of the target was a burning heat source that generated a 2 million candle-power infrared signature, providing a target for missiles equipped with an IR heat-seeking head. Launched from an altitude between 2500 and 17,000 meters - western radio intercept reports mentioned Il-28s delivering a target from 12,000 meters - at a speed of 750 to 1200 km/h, the M-6 could burn for a minimum of 195 seconds. This target was also designed to attract radar-guided missiles. A four-sided pyramid-shaped reflector made of metallized fabric with a radar signature similar to that of a medium bomber was deployed beneath the parachute canopy. A MiG-21 radar could "see" the target at a maximum range of 20 km, and an R-3S missile could be fired at a range of 5 to 8 km. Rather resilient, the M-6 target was capable, in the best-case scenario, of surviving two missiles.

Beneath the parachute canopy was a pyramidal structure made of metallized fabric, which provided a radar signature equivalent to that of a medium bomber, thus enabling the firing of radar-guided missiles. A MiG-21 could "see" the target at a maximum range of 20 km and fire an R-3S missile between 5 and 8 km. The relatively resilient M-6 target could, in the best-case scenario, withstand up to two missiles. SAB (Svetyashchaya Aviatsionnaya Bomba) illuminating bombs, formerly used for reconnaissance or night bombing, also served as targets. Their pyrotechnic devices allowed them to fulfill the same function as the M-6 targets, although they could not be used for firing radar-guided missiles. Although the SAB-100 bomb used the same external casing as the M-6 target, the size and sometimes the shape of other SAB bombs varied depending on their caliber (SAB-100/90, SAB-100MN/MP, SAB-250-200, SAB-250T or even SAB-500-350...).

Each bomb, upon release, freed seven incandescent devices that descended under individual parachutes. The deployment of these devices followed this sequence: after the bomb was released, a detonator ignited a cordite charge within seconds, ejecting the bomb's rear casing. This process was facilitated by the deployment of a small extraction parachute located behind the rear casing. Upon its ejection, this parachute triggered the opening of the extraction parachutes for the light devices, which had already automatically ignited upon detachment of the rear casing. Then, the torch's extraction parachute gradually deployed its main parachute, allowing the devices to burn for five minutes. On August 24, 1990, this type of bomb sparked considerable interest among UFO enthusiasts when several seemingly stationary lights were observed and filmed by numerous people in the Greifswald region. Some even spotted a luminous sphere approaching the main formation before disappearing once it reached the formation. It was nothing else than a missile hurtling toward its target, its engine failing due to lack of fuel shortly before impact! Interestingly, General Tarasenko himself confirmed in a documentary made a few years later that the UFOs observed that evening were indeed SABs (> Link at 30'06"). It is generally accepted that the Czechoslovakians were active in LSZ II that day, but no document confirms this.
Another target used was the RM-3V (Raketa-Mishen, target missile), derived from the Vympel K-13 (AA-2 "Atoll") missile. Carrier aircraft carried live missiles and R-3P (rakticheskaya, training) missiles without explosive warheads. The lead aircraft first fired an RM-3V, which the wingman shot down. Then, the procedure was reversed: the wingman fired an RM-3V and the lead aircraft fired a live missile. It was possible to launch a missile up to 25 seconds after the RM-3V was fired.

During the summer of 1986, Pilot First Class Oleg Kozlov ferried an Il-28 "Beagle" from the 65.OBAE to Altes Lager to serve as an instructional airframe (1). In November, the unit's remaining "Beagle" aircraft were withdrawn from use and replaced by 12 MiG-23M and UB. The choice of the latter aircraft type was probably an improvised solution before introduction of a more specialized airframe for the task. The origin of these aircraft remains questionable. At most, we can state that a derelict MiG-23M originating from the 35.APIB of Zerbst was present in the Damgarten dump in 1992. Also, in November 1986, the 74.OBAE was disbanded. The 65.OBAE composition changed with the Floggers arrival. It was then composed of two aviation flights (aviazveno) and a third separate flight (the 125.OBAZ) composed of former 74.OBAE elements. The MiG-23M did not tow targets. Instead, they launched M-6 targets (that was the case to train the sailors at Swinoujscie), glide bombs (probably PM-6 targets) and S-5P chaff rockets - the chaff created a radar echo that could be used as a target - fired from classic UB-32 rocket pods. Also, the MiG-23 were used as "mirror" targets at Wustrow (2) at Wustrow.

The MiG-23M of the 65.OBAE did not last long. They were withdrawn in November 1989 when the aircraft were flown to and stored at Step' Airbase (Olovyannaya) in the Transbaykal. On November 25, 1989 two Su-25 of the 357.OShAP from Brandis joined the 65.OBAE so that the pilots could train on this new airframe. In addition, a new Su-25UB (n°50) two-seat trainer was delivered from Ulan-Ude to Damgarten in April 1990. In early May 1990, the 65.OBAE received ten new Su-25BM ground-attack and target-towing aircraft with yellow numbers from Tbilisi in Georgia (n° 01-06 / 08-11) (see > Ground-Attack Aviation, part 9). The Su-25UB remained on strength with the unit, while the two Su-25 from Brandis were sent to Ovruch in Ukraine for storage. Target towing was not resumed with the Su-25BM, because the new Kometa target-towing system was still in the testing phase, which was not completed until October 1991. The Su-25BM could nevertheles carry M6 and PM-6 targets. It should be noted that L-39C were also observed at Damgarten alongside the Su-25BM. However, we do not know whether these planes were attached to the 65.OBAE or detached from the 368.OShAP from Demmin. Also, two new Su-25BM then joined the 368.OShAP by the end of July 1990 at the latest. Contrary to normal practice, they were delivered without bort numbers and were assigned the numbers 16 and 17. In October 1990, the 65.OBAE aircraft were redeployed to Demmin and squadron personnel were divided up between the 357.OShAP and the fourth squadron of the 368.OShAP (3). The 65.OBAE thus was immediately disbanded thereafter on November 1, 1990. The yellow bort numbers on the planes were then painted red (and sometimes changed) to bring them in line with those of the 368.OShAP. The 12 Su-25BM were assigned to the 1.AE, while 16 Su-25 were transfered to the 357.OShAP at Brandis where they likely replaced the aircraft with the least remaining service life.

With special thanks to Oleg Kozlov for his unstinting help

Su-25 ex-65.OBAE PHOTO PAGE

Il-28 WRECKS PHOTO PAGE

notes

(1) Several isolated Il-28s have been observed at various bases over time. Some have been used for combat damage repair training.
(2) The target aircraft was detected by the firing unit radar. A second radar repeated this radar echo of the target with different coordinates. It is towards this second fictive or mirror echo that shells or missiles were fired. A special device permitted to assess whether the target had been hit. Schematic diagram > HERE.
(3) Andrey Kozhemyakin, Su-25 specialist and author of a two-volume work entitled "Shturmovik Su-25, In Action for 30 Years" (Shturmovik Su-25, Tridtsat' Let v Stroyu) told us that, in 1989, many units were disbanded and consequently many pilots found themselves without planes. It was thus decided to set up a fourth squadron in several regiments, while the number of aircraft in service with these same units remained the same. The excess pilots in the fourth squadrons flew the planes in the three squadrons, constituting a traditional regiment. It is not certain that an additional squadron was formed within the 357.OShAP at Brandis. However, this was the case at Demmin where, according to official documents, a fourth squadron was formed in November 1989.

The target-towing units < Part 1

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